

# Information and data protection in XR training scenarios:

straightforward solutions to comply with modern requirements.

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### Agenda

- 1. Overview of Fondazione SAFE
  - Who we are and what we do
  - Our activities entailing XR.
  - The Calvarina Testing & Training facility.
- 2. Presentation of the Paper
  - General security context
  - The use of XR and VR technology in the military context
  - Shortcomings identified so far in military applications
  - Current cybersecurity guidelines for NATO
  - Data/cyber security risks in designing a CBRN VR scenario
  - Solutions adopted by Fondazione SAFE
- 3. Conclusions and final considerations





#### Fondazione SAFE - Who are we?

Fondazione SAFE is an **independent Italian not-for-profit foundation**, established in 2018.

SAFE promotes, through its own funds and by participating in calls for projects financed by the European Union and other international donors, high-impact non-profit activities in the sectors of security, defense, and rule of law.

Project management

Capacity building and training

Technological innovation in the security and defense sectors





#### Fondazione SAFE - Our team



Dynamic, highly specialised team composed by a core staff of 20 people dislocated between Ravenna and Soave, a project office in Lebanon (Beirut) and a project office in Lybia (Tripoli).



40 projects implemented since 2018, 28 of which are currently ongoing



More than **70.000.000 €** of overall budget under implementation



70+ partners in project activities and part of SAFE's network



### Ongoing projects with XR elements (1/2)



• Development and maintenance of rescEU CBRN mobile laboratories and rescEU CBRN detection, sampling, identification and monitoring capabilities



 Real-time Monitoring and Sampling of CB menaces for improved dynamic mapping of threats, vulnerabilities and response capacities



Virtual Enhanced Reality for interoperable training of civilian and military CBRN operators - VERTIGO



### Ongoing projects with XR elements (2/2)



• NATO HFM-NMSG-354 Research Task Group on the "Study, Design, Building and Deployment of a CBRN XR Training Platform"



• SAFE self-funded initiative for the virtualization of the Calvarina facility (creation of a CBRN VR training scenario involving a clandestine facility).





### The Calvarina testing & training area

- Former NATO base, offering 25.000m2 of testing &
   training ground in an isolated area.
- Cleaned, restored and secured in 2020.
- Hosts various buildings of an urban-military nature, including two underground bunkers and a take-off/landing area for helicopters/drones.
- Currently, the only Testing & Training Facility
  in Italy that can be accessed by both private and
  public actors.







# Information and data protection in XR training scenarios: straightforward solutions to comply with modern requirements

#### General context:

- Global crises relaunched the concept of CBRN as a concrete threat
- Affordability and increased efficiency are more and more attractive even to major military powers
- NR/VR solutions are gaining **growing attention** also thanks to enhanced realism



# The use of XR and VR technology in the military context

 Armed forces are increasing introduction of XR and VR solutions.

- To date, training activities (including for maintenance of equipment) are the ones most impacted by VR/XR applications.
- The use of XR headsets during combat operations is being tested for ground troops.



IVAS system undergoing testing with the US army. Credit:
Microsoft.





### Shortcomings identified so far in military applications

- 1. Affordability distributed acquisition of new technologies can be expensive.
- 2. Technological Maturity the state-of-the-art of XR/VR solutions is evolving rapidly
- 3. Personnel greater strain on existing IT personnel and trainers is expected at the beginning.
- 4. Cybersecurity vulnerabilities of XR/VR systems are to be assessed and covered continuously.





### Current cybersecurity guidelines for NATO

Cyberspace has been recognised among the traditional domains of operation since 2016. This includes identification and acknowledgement of malicious cumulative cyber risks.

#### However:

- Dedicated technical standards needs to be developed and are currently lacking (both EU and NATO)
- This evolution depends on the commitment of States to develop standards
- NATO members are ultimately responsible for their own cyber defence
- EU MS who are also NATO members must consider GDPR guidelines



From the hardware perspective, wireless solutions are to be preferred for freedom of movement, but entail increased risk of:

- Eavesdropping
- Interferences
- Unauthorized accesses




A student performs a simulated pre-flight inspection on a VR system. Credit Embry-Riddle/Daryl LaBello





From the software perspective, the following elements are to be considered:

- Presence of sensitive data and content regarding the settings of the scenario
- Appropriate encryption level to access the library/launch the software
- Third party software monitoring to avoid unauthorised data transmission



Example of built-in lock system to access files/apps. Credit: META





Additional key elements regarding the settings of the scenarios:

- When operating in a scenario entailing classified data for its setting,
   cybersecurity measures must be addressed properly.
- Even when operating in a scenario setting that does **not** entail **classified information** for its development, the **procedures** undertaken by the trainees **may be sensitive**.





Generation of aggregated trainees' data and cyber/data security issues:

- The generation of an automated **After Action Report** (AAR) always brings data protection issues for the trainees and possible data classification concerns.
- Even if anonymised, aggregated data coming from several AARs must be considered classified as it potentially highlights gaps in trainees' preparation - and MS defence.





When it comes to network setup, different solutions involve different limitations:

- Internet-connected: is the most exposed to risks such as unauthorized/involuntary upload or transfer of information during the development phase, data breaches, and unauthorized access.
- Intranet-connected: mostly vulnerable to insider attacks, robust security measures to prevent unauthorized access must be put in place.
- Standalone offline: it greatly reduces the risks associated with network connectivity. It allows the whole system and associated scenarios to work isolated from the external environment.





# Solutions adopted by Fondazione SAFE in the context of EU and NATO RTG sponsored activities

#### Hardware

- Integrity of headsets (conducted by the scenario developers)
- Password protection that requires hard reset for removal, making the headset data secure
- Physical security of the headsets guaranteed both inside and outside the HQ



Testing of the CBRN VR solution at SAFE Testing & Training facility.

Credit: SAFE

MSG-207 Symposium, 19th October





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#### Software

- Password prompt triggered while accessing scenario
- BIOS encryption, SSD encryption and user and password
- Generation of anonym AARs to comply with data protection
- To avoid the generation of classified aggregated data, XR can be used instead of pure VR





# Solutions adopted by Fondazione SAFE in the context of EU and NATO RTG sponsored activities

#### Network

- Use of trusted and heavily protected networks if and when necessary.
- Offline, standoffs versions are to be preferred in any other case.
- Use dedicated hardware to host all the software related to the XR/VR solution, as to minimize network's access from different devices





#### Conclusions and final considerations

- 1. Growing interest in XR/VR solution for armed forces around the world
- 2. Need to urgently define specific NATO technical standards and centralise the effort
- 3. Creative and low-cost solutions can be put in place as stop-gap measures
- 4. The technical aspects must be substantiated by the spread of a cybersecurity culture at all levels



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